Washington Post Editors Get it Wrong on Iraq -Again

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First of all, thank you to all of our troops serving in Iraq (as well as elsewhere abroad) especially those whom I know personally. Congratulations on reaching a milestone that hopefully leads down a path that all can be proud of -Iraqi's and American's alike.

This editorial in the Washington Post on Iraq incredulously claims that President Obama is "neglecting" Iraq. Mentioning meddling by Iran, al-Qaeda coming in through the border on Syria, and the various issues with the Kurd's, they make this bewildering claim:

Both Mr. Obama and Mr. al-Maliki tend to play down these concerns -- but then, both have political motives to do so. Mr. Obama wants to stick to the withdrawal timetable that he outlined several months ago and that was an early foundation of his presidential campaign. Mr. al-Maliki wants to appear, ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections, as a strong leader and champion of Iraqi nationalism. Both are consequently inclined to minimize the continuing problems of terrorism and political discord and to take risks in pressing forward with the U.S. drawdown.

Now yes, both are sticking to the SOFA agreement made between Mr. al-Maliki and former President Bush but they're doing so because it has reached the point where Iraqi's and only Iraqi's can determine their destiny from here on -not because of some wish that things weren't as bad as they are. No one is downplaying anything. If U.S. troops were to stay simply because violence is taking place or it'll get worse as U.S. troops pull out, America would never leave. U.S. troops make up 130,000, Iraqi troops and security forces are 700,000+. At some point the 700,000+ need to be as capable as 130,000. Obviously Iraq not having an air force and only just now taking delivery of its first patrol ship means that it won't literally be as capable as the U.S. Military but in terms of on the street security, it can only get where it needs to be through experience. Most troops on the ground and many Commanders do feel it is a little premature but acknowledge that all of the problems that are to arise would no matter when U.S. troops started drawing down. The feeling that it is a little premature is due to confidence in the training of Iraqi forces, not in what will happen during the drawdown or a belief that the Iraqi people won’t work things out themselves one way or the other.

The editors do make the exhausted claim that the U.S. must help Iraq settle the Kirkuk issue, which U.S. administration's have tried to do since political reconciliation started in Iraq. Kirkuk though is a severe challenge on the constitutional front. Although the U.S. must help where it can in resolving the issue, the U.N. is running frontman on the issue with its Assistance Mission for Iraq having initiated rounds of talks to save the north from a potential cross-border war, the struggle over the future status of the northern city of Kirkuk has entered its decisive phase. Failure could lead to the ultimate disintegration of Iraq but as noted in an Economist article, by a Western diplomat: "The trouble is, doing nothing in Kirkuk is almost as bad as doing something," The inter-Iraqi feud over Kirkuk is exacerbated by external actors with the Turkish government seeing itself as a protector of Iraq's Turkoman population.

Although for now they remain committed to a non-violent solution, Iraq's political factions have maneuvered into a no-win stalemate on Kirkuk from which they seem unable to extricate themselves. Consequently, they ought to be provided with an alternative means to save face by a neutral third party. Toward that end, UNAMI's proposal proves the most viable option put forward in years. ... Over the coming weeks, while carefully maintaining the appearance of an honest broker, Washington should try to back UNAMI's suggestions with balanced incentives and carefully applied pressure.

The Iraq Army and U.S. troops have been fighting (and will "indefinitely") to eliminate militants in Kirkuk since the start of June of this year. U.S. troops can only continue to provide security while American engagement has taken political reconciliation only as far as a non-Iraqi, non-Sunni/Shiite, non-Kurd government can. This article has an interesting quote:

Yet even Kurdish politicians, who welcomed the Americans as liberators more than any other Iraqi group, mostly agree it is time for them to leave urban areas.
"Those divides between communities would be there even if the Americans stayed," said Mahmoud Othman, senior lawmaker from the main Kurdish alliance in parliament.
"It's between Iraqis. If they can't get together and solve their problems, what can the Americans do?"

Mushriq 'Abbas filed a report for al-Hatay on Kurdistan (via IraqSlogger but no link to the report, info taken from this article) reporting that in Kurdistan, the two mainstream Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK, are most likely not going to hold onto the 90% of seats they won in the 2005 elections. The Kurdish leader is being challenged by an ex-friend and comrade in Nusherwan Mustapha, who seceded from the party and is now waging a campaign under the slogans of "reform" and "change" (Obama and McCain's campaigns ruined those terms for this blogger).

It isn't only up to the U.S. to help Iraq reconcile its internal differences and reintegrate with rest of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia for one, as well as other Sunni dominated Middle East countries need to come off the fences.

At a recent forum on U.S.-Saudi relations in Washington, D.C., current and former Saudi officials decried the previous U.S. administration's Middle East policies. Yet in shunning the Shiite-dominated government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a regime they deem inimical to their interests, the Saudis -- along with other Sunni Arab regimes -- appear to have internalized the core foreign policy impulse of the Bush administration.

This myopic approach has had the perverse effect of amplifying Iran's already outsized influence in Iraq and throughout the region. It has also fueled Iraqi suspicions about the intentions of its Sunni Arab neighbors, hindering the reintegration of Iraq into the Arab world.
...it (U.S.) has increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to begin normalizing relations with Iraq. On his recent trip to the region, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reiterated his appeal to Riyadh and Cairo to appoint ambassadors to Baghdad.
Iraq's recent posting of an ambassador to Riyadh, its first since 1991, offers an opportunity for reciprocal steps by the Saudis and a way to move beyond the Saudi-Iraqi tensions on display at the latest Arab summit in Doha. But so far, Washington's appeals have met with little success, jeopardizing its broader diplomatic efforts to establish regional stability. (Emphasis' added)

The Obama Administration is already re-establishing diplomatic ties with Syria with the most immediate goal most likely an agreement to crack down better along the Syria/Iraq border even after Iraq and America already asked Syria to prevent al-Qa'ida and Baathist insurgent groups from launching a wave of attacks.
Regarding future U.S./Iraq relations from this point on:

Delaying withdrawals because of recent bombings would have given insurgents veto power over U.S. actions. More perilously, it would have conceded a key strategic goal of the ongoing insurgency by undercutting the legitimacy of the Iraqi government as sovereign over Iraqi territory. It would also have undermined U.S. credibility in the region at a time when the Obama administration is seeking buy-in and support for its ambitious regional agenda from partners in the Arab world.
Unfortunately, the improved security and accompanying degree of normalcy that has returned to many areas of the country has allowed complacency and overconfidence to set in among Iraqi political actors, frustrating significant political progress. ... U.S. influence over the nature and pace of the Iraqi political process has considerably diminished and will wane even more as forces draw down. But it is not insignificant.
In light of current political realities in Iraq, the U.S. role going forward must necessarily be less obtrusive, predicated on diplomatic means, and focused on bolstering United Nations-led efforts at brokering political compromise. ...
...The upcoming January 2010 national parliamentary elections, which will continue to polarize politics and ratchet up rhetorical differences, will only complicate the task. A series of political breakthroughs in the midst of what will be a hard-fought contest for political supremacy is hard to imagine. In fact, the current political dynamics are likely to skew political rivalries and complicate future negotiations.

Or as Judah Grunstien put it in his blog:

The questions regarding Iraq's future remain both political and unanswered. If political identity congeals around some functioning incarnation of a state, democratic or otherwise, there will be stability. If, on the other hand, political identity congeals around the incoherent violence that continues even now, then the sporadic attacks will take shape as a coherent movement, signaling a return to ethno-sectarian war.
(A different post)The resemblance to what we're likely to leave behind in Iraq is obvious, and reflects the fact that when you militarize the political alchemy of nation-building (i.e., COIN), you end up with a nation heavily weighted towards the security -- as opposed to the civil -- sector.

Don't know what else the U.S. can do besides continue to provide security to allow advancement and maneuverability through such political issues. Plus, if the U.S. keeps rushing back in with troops, all you're doing is maintaining a status quo by keeping the Iraq nation "heavily weighted towards the security" that has to be allowed to end someday.